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UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,

_U.S.__, No. 87-107, 89 D.A.R. 7697
(June 19, 1989).

Racial Harassment in Workplace Not
Actionable Under Section 1981
Racial harassment relating to the
conditions of employment is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. section 1981, since
the statute is restricted in its scope to
forbidding racial discrimination in the
"mak[ing] and enforc[ement]" of contracts.
Petitioner, a black woman, brought
suit against her employer, respondent
credit union, alleging that respondent
harassed her, failed to promote her, and
discharged her, all on account of her
race. The district court held that a claim
for racial harassment is not actionable
under section 1981. In addition, it instructed the jury that, in order to prevail
on her promotion discrimination claim,
petitioner must prove that she was better
qualified than the white employee who
was allegedly employed. The jury found
for respondent and the court of appeals
affirmed.
The Supreme Court, per Justice Kennedy, specifically declined to overrule its
decision in Runyon v. Mccrary, 427
U.S. 160 (1976), which held that section
1981 prohibits racial discrimination in
the making and enforcement of contracts.
However, the Patterson Court strictly
interpreted the application of the statute's "right ... to make ... contracts," holding that it extends only to the formation
of a contract; it does not extend to
conduct by the employer after the contract has been established. Therefore,
breach of the contract's terms or the
imposition of discriminatory working
conditions falls outside section 1981 protections. The "right...to ... enforce contracts," on the other hand, does not
extend beyond conduct by an employer
which impairs an employee's ability to
legally enforce his/her established contract rights.
The "same right" phrase of section
1981 cannot be interpreted to incorporate state contract law. To do so would
effectively limit causes of action under
section 1981 to those arising from state
law. Such a limitation contradicts
Runyon. In addition, the Court found
that the argument that "severe or pervasive" racial harassment can transform
a nonactionable challenge to employment conditions into a viable challenge
to the employer's refusal to contract is
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without merit.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
Marshall and Blackmun, dissented, strongly questioning the majority's "needlessly
cramped interpretation" of section 1981
and noting powerful historical evidence
of broader congressional intent.

Will v. Michigan Department of
State Police,

-U.S.__, No. 87-1207,
89 D.A.R. 7745 (June 19, 1989).

State is Not "Person" Subject
to Suit In State Court
in Section 1983 Action
Neither states nor state officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
section 1983. This finding is supported
by the statute's language, congressional
purpose, and legislative history.
Petitioner filed suit in Michigan state
court alleging that respondents had improperly denied him a promotion in violation of section 1983. Section 1983 provides that any person who deprives an
individual of his/ her constitutional rights
under color of state law shall be liable
to that individual. The state court ruled
for petitioner, finding that both respondents Department of State Police and the
Director of State Police were "persons"
under section 1983. The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that neither were
"persons" under the statute.
The U.S. Supreme Court, per Justice
White, affirmed. The statute's language
does not satisfy the principle of statutory
construction that intended changes in
the constitutional balance between the
states and the federal government be
specifically and clearly stated. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is one of
the well-established common law immunities and defenses that Congress did not
intend to override in enacting section
I 983. Finally, a suit against state officials acting in their official capacities is
not a suit against the officials, but rather
is a suit against the officials' offices. As
such, it is no different from a suit against
the state itself.
A dissent by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens would hold
that states are "persons" within the
meaning of section 1983. It points out
that the "clear statement" principle employed by the majority to obviate analysis of the statute's legislative intent
and history applies only to Eleventh
Amendment cases, which affects only

cases brought against states in federal
court. Since the present case arose in
state court, the principle is irrelevant.
Moreover, the question whether states
are "persons" under section 1983 is separate and distinct from the question
whether they may assert a defense of
common law sovereign immunity. The
dissent would reverse the lower court
decision and remand for resolution of
the question whether Michigan would
assert common law sovereign immunity
and, if so, whether that would preclude
this suit.

Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,

_U.S.__, No. 87-1241,
89 D.A.R. 7725 (June 19, 1989).

States May Be Held Liable For
Damages in Federal Court
This plurality opinion by Justice
Brennan concluded that states may be
held liable for damages in federal court
under sections 104 and 106 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA).
To recoup costs of cleaning up the
nation's first Superfund site, the federal
government sued respondent, successor
in interest of a dismantled coal gasification plant which had produced coal tar
as a byproduct. Respondent, in turn,
filed a third-party complaint against
petitioner, the State of Pennsylvania,
arguing that petitioner was partially
responsible as an "owner or operator"
of the hazardous waste site. The district
court dismissed respondent's complaint,
accepting Pennsylvania's claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court
of appeals held that the language of
CERCLA, as amended, clearly renders
states liable for monetary damages and
that Congress had the power to do so
when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
A majority of the Supreme Court,
comprising Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia, concluded in Parts I and II of the opinion that
the plain language of the statute authorizes suits against states in federal court.
Section 101(2l)'s express inclusion of
states within its definition of "person,"
and section 101(20)(D)'s plain statement
that state and local governments are to
be considered "owners or operators" in
all but very narrow circumstances, together establish that Congress intended
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that states be liable for clean-up costs
under section 107 of CERCLA.
A plurality of the Court, comprising
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,
and Stevens, agreed in Part III of the
opinion that Congress has the authority
to render states liable for money damages in federal court when legislating
pursuant to the Commerce Clause.

Mallard v. U.S. District Court,

_U.S.__, No. 87-1490,
89 D.A.R. 5678 (May 3, 1989).
Federal Court May Not Force Lawyer
To Represent Indigent in Civil Case

A federal court is not authorized to
require an unwilling attorney to represent an indigent litigant in a civil suit.
Petitioner was denied a motion to
withdraw from a suit involving indigent
inmates. Petitioner argued that forcing
him to represent the inmates in a complex action would require trial skills he
did not possess, and would thus force
him to violate his ethical obligation to
take on only those cases he could handle
competently. In addition, petitioner cited
28 U.S.C. section 1915(d) for the proposition that federal courts may only "request" an attorney to represent any person claiming in f orma pauper is status.
After a magistrate denied his motion to
withdraw, petitioner appealed to the district court. The court upheld the magistrate's decision, and a subsequent petition
for writ of mandamus was denied by the
court of appeal.
The Supreme Court, per Justice Brennan, distinguished the "request" language
of section 1915(d), applicable to attorneys of in f orma pauper is proceedings,
from the "shall" language of section
1915(c), applicable to court officers and
witnesses. If Congress had intended that
court-appointed attorneys be required
to represent indigent litigants, it would
have followed the strict language of section 1915(c). Moreover, when Congress
passed section 1915(d) in 1892, it chose
not to replicate the language of several
state statutes providing for the "appointment" or "assignment" of counsel.
Rather, it chose to merely "request" that
they serve. Respondent's contention that
the federal courts possess inherent authority to require lawyers to serve was
not considered by the Court, since the
lower courts did not invoke such authority in reaching their decisions.
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Missouri v. Jenkins,

_U.S._ No. 88-64,
89 C.D.O.S. 4541 (June 22, 1989).
Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights Cases
May Be Enhanced to Account for Delay

Plaintiffs in a successful civil rights
action may receive enhanced attorneys'
fees under 42 U.S.C. section 1988 to
compensate for delay in payment.
The underlying case involved a major
school desegregation trial in Kansas City,
in which the district court held for plaintiffs on the merits. The plaintiff class
was represented by a private attorney
(Benson) and the Legal Defense Fund
(LDF) of the NAACP. Both requested
attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
section 1988. In calculating Benson's fees,
the court noted that the "market rate"
for his services were $125-$175 per hour,
but awarded fees based upon a rate of
$200 per hour. The court used the higher
rate due, in part, to the delay in payment
for the services rendered. The court also
took account of the delay in payment
when setting the rates for Benson's associates and the LDF attorneys. Thus, the
other attorneys received the current
market rate for their services, not the
rate prevailing at the time of the services. The court also awarded fees for
law students, law graduates, and paralegals who worked on the case. Again,
these rates were set at the current market
rate to reflect delay in payment. The
defendants contested the enhanced
awards.
The Court, per Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, Kennedy, Stevens, and White,
held that the Eleventh Amendment does
not prohibit enhancement of a fee award
against a state to compensate for delay
in payment and that section 1988 awards
may include hourly rates for clerks and
paralegals that are not limited to the
out-of-pocket costs to the attorney.
The Court first rejected the contention that a state may not be compelled
to pay enhanced fees due to its Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Relying on Hutto
v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), the Court
distinguished between "retroactive monetary relier' and "prospective injunctive
relief." Attorneys' fees belong to the latter category, placing them outside a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The Court reasoned that if fees are outside the strictures of the Eleventh Amendment, so are the processes for calculating
those fees.
Missouri also argued that section
1988 does not explicitly allow enhancement of fees, and the Eleventh Amend-
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ment requires specific legislative intent
to allow enhanced fees. The Court rejected this argument as based upon a faulty
analogy to federal immunity. In Library
of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310
(1986), the Court held that the federal
government did not specifically waive
its immunity from enhanced attorneys'
fees in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (the "no-interest rule" case),
but the present case is distinguishable.
The Court found no need to determine
whether Congress had addressed state
immunity. Rather, the issue is a straightforward matter of statutory interpretation: whether "reasonable attorneys' fees"
provided for in section 1988 includes
enhancement for delay in payment. The
Court found that enhancement is within
tile contemplation of the statute.
The Court further held that "reasonable attorneys' fees" means compensation
for work product. Since law clerks and
paralegals contribute to and share in
work product, their contributions must
be included. Since "reasonable" equates
to "market rate" in the other areas of
attorneys' fees, there is no reason to
alter this standard for law clerks and
paralegals.

UNITED ST ATES
DISTRICT COURTS
United States v.
Hughes Helicopters, Inc.,

_F.Supp___, 89 D.A.R. 7687,
No. CV 87-1840-WDK (June 1, 1989).
False Claims Act Private
Right of Action is Constitutional

The constitutionality of the False
Claims Act, under which private citizens
may sue government contractors, was
recently upheld in a federal court ruling.
The Act, 31 U.S.C. section 3730,
permits private citizens to prosecute defense contractors or other enterprises
for fraud against the government. The
initial civil filings remain under seal for
sixty days, during which time the U.S.
Department of Justice may review the
facts and assume prosecution of the lawsuit. Providing that the whistleblower's
information is new, he/she is entitled to
a bounty from the money recovered in
the civil suit, whether or not the Justice
Department joins in the case.
Stillwell, a private citizen and former
McDonnell-Douglas employee, sued the
defense contractor on behalf of the
United States, alleging the company
overcharged the Army for the Apache
attack helicopter by more than $175
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million. The defendants asserted three
arguments challenging the constitutionality of the False Claims Act based on
the separation of powers doctrine, violation of the Appointment Clause (U.S.
Constitution, article II, section 2), and a
private citizen's lack of standing.
The court, per Judge Keller, upheld
the constitutionality of the Act in that
Congress has the authority to delegate
the power to litigate on behalf of the
United States. Moreover, the Justice Department may join the suit at any time,
which leaves sufficient power in the executive branch. Thus, the Appointment
Clause is not violated. The bounty provision affords a private citizen standing
by according the plaintiff "a personal,
identifiable interest in the litigation."
Other risks, involving the danger of
losing one's job or being blacklisted in
the industry, also bestow standing on
the False Claims Act plaintiff.

issue, the court upheld the "general rule"
that judicial decisions apply retroactively
while legislative decisions are proactive.
The court held that torts cases giving
rise to new rules of law typically receive
full retroactive effect. The court also
opined that applying the Foley ruling
retroactively would reinstate "predictability" in the workplace, in that recovery
for breach of contract is quantitatively
more certain than a tort recovery where
awards are less predictable.

CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT

On May 30, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal rejected the Center for
Public Interest Law's (CPIL) petition
for writ of mandate in its challenge to
the Fair Political Practices Commission's
(FPPC) interpretation of Propositions
68 and 73, two campaign finance reform
initiatives which were approved by the
voters in June 1988. (See CRLR Vol. 9,
No. I (Winter 1989) pp. 111-12 for background information.)
Proposition 68 would have created
the Campaign Reform Fund to subsidize
legislative campaigns of qualifying candidates who agree to comply with overall
campaign expenditure limitations and
contribution limitations. The court found
that Proposition 73's ban on the use of
"public moneys" for political campaigns
irreconcilably conflicts with Proposition
68's provisions establishing the Fund.
The court found that the Fund consists
of "public moneys", rejecting CPIL's
argument that the Fund does not belong
to the state because it may not be appropriated or otherwise allocated by the
legislature. The court also rejected
CPIL's contention that the tax checkoff
provision in Proposition 68 operates as
a tax credit, which is not considered to
be "public moneys".
CPIL has petitioned the California
Supreme Court for review of the Fourth
District's ruling.

Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp.,

_Cal. 3d_, No. L.A. 32284,
89 D.A.R. 6755 (May 25, 1989).
Foley Ban on Tort Damages in
Wrongful Termination Cases
Applies Retroactively

Employment cases which had not
gone to trial as of January 30, 1989, will
be decided using the analysis and holding
in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47
Cal. 3d 654 ( 1988), which prohibits tort
damages for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a
wrongful termination suit. (See CRLR
Vol. 9, No. l (Winter 1989) p. 112 for
background information.)
Newman was terminated by Emerson
Radio Corporation in May 1982 after
ten years of service. He alleged an oral
agreement to terminate his employment
only upon a showing of just cause. Newman argued that prior to termination,
notification and an opportunity to correct the behavior should have been extended. He asserted that Emerson's
conduct violated public policy, breached
an implied contract, and violated the
implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
The Supreme Court, per Chief Justice
Lucas, joined by Justices Panelli, Eagleson, and Arguelles, held that Foley is
retroactive, and dismissed the cause of
action seeking tort damages for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. In ruling on the Foley
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CALIFORNIA COURTS
OF APPEAL
Center for Public Interest Law
v. Fair Political Practices Commission,

_Cal. App. 3d_, No. D008786,
89 D.A.R. 7125 (May 30, 1989).
Proposition 73 Precludes
Proposition 68 's Tax
Checkofffor Campaigns

Newland v. Kizer,

_Cal. App. 3d_, No. D007649,
89 D.A.R. 4932 (Apr. 17, 1989).
State Agency May Be Forced to Promulgate Regulations Mandated By I.Aw

I

The Fourth District Court of Appeal
held that the California Department of
Health Services (DHS) must adopt regulations governing the temporary operation of long-term health care facilities
by receivers so that state decertification
does not force elderly patients to make
sudden, unprepared transfers from one
nursing home to another.
This case materialized when federal
authorities decertified the Vista Golden
Age nursing home in San Diego from
participation in Medicare. The plaintiffs,
patient beneficiaries of Medicare, were
required by law to transfer to another
facility. The defendants were OHS and
its director, which had failed to promulgate regulations governing receiverships
under which the patients could have
remained at the facility.
In reversing the superior court's denial of relief, the Fourth District, per
Justices Kremer, Todd, and Froehlich,
held that Health and Safety Code section
1335 affirmatively requires regulations
governing receivership. The court disagreed with the defendants' contention
that section 1335 involves discretionary
duties immune from court interference.
The court concluded that a holding for
defendants would emasculate section
1335 and that a judicial mandate requiring the agency to issue regulations is
appropriate, so long as the mandate does
not dictate the contents of the regulations.
People v. Dollar Rent-A-Car Systems,
Inc., et al.,

_Cal. App. 3d_, No. A039377,
89 D.A.R. 7111 (June 1, 1989).
Car Damage Waivers Misrepresented
As Insurance Are Unlawful

The First District Court of Appeal
affirmed a superior court ruling that car
rental agencies are subject to penalty for
selling collision damage waivers (CDW)
as "insurance", as unfair competition
and false and misleading, in violation of
Business and Professions Code sections
17200 and 17500. The suit was filed by
Attorney General John Van de Kamp in
San Francisco. Following trial, judgment
was entered to enjoin the defendant car
rental company, and to impose cost penalties. On appeal, the First District, per
judges Low, King, and Haning, upheld
the trial court's findings that defendants
made untrue and confusing representations and caused customers to be misled
into believing that a CDW is insurance;
and defendants misrepresented the cost
of repairs and loss of use of the damaged
vehicle when pursuing claims against
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their customers. The court affirmed a
permanent injunction and civil judgment
of $100,000.

SUPERIOR COURTS
Ingredient Communication Council,
Inc. v. Van de Kamp,

No. 504601 (Sacramento
Superior Court).
Superior Court Hears Oral
Argument in Proposition 65
Compliance Trial

On June 6, the Sacramento Superior
Court completed hearing oral arguments
in the case that will test whether the use
of toll-free telephone numbers constitutes compliance with the warning requirement of Proposition 65, the Safe
Drinking Water and Toxics Enforcement
Act of 1986.
In a related case, People v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., No. 89576 (San Francisco
Superior Court), the pleadings are filed
and discovery continues. The ruling in
Ingredient Communication Council will
probably be dispositive in this case,
which involves the same question. (See
CRLR Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1989) p.
127 for background information on
both cases.)
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